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UNIVERSITY OPPOSITION TO 
UNFETTERED RESEARCH: 
A NEW BEDFELLOW FOR BIOTECH? 
 
Katherine L. Record† 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines university opposition to a proposed statu-
tory exemption to infringement liability for basic genetic research and 
patient care.  Gene patenting has allowed patentees to bar basic ge-
netic research, slowing the progress of developing and administering 
diagnostics and gene-targeting therapeutics.  Debates over the merits 
of gene patents have been heated, most recently leading to an un-
precedented invalidation of several broad patents covering all varia-
tions and use of two genes linked to breast and ovarian cancers.  More 
important, however (as this ruling was reversed in part), are proposed 
statutory exemptions to infringement liability. The Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Ge-
netics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) has promulgated an exemption 
from liability for infringement that occurs in the course of research.  
This exemption would promote basic research by granting academic 
scientists unfettered access to genetic material.  The proposal does not 
alter the patentability of gene sequences; it merely restricts patentees 
from using infringement threats to stop research.   
Surprisingly, the Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM), an organization responsible for promoting development of 
university research, opposes such an exemption.  The AUTM alleges 
that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incentive for 
private firms to invest in upstream discoveries made in university 
laboratories.  Yet the exemption would do the opposite: by opening 
the doors to research relating to any gene segment, a research exemp-
tion would accelerate basic research.  Moreover, it would not affect 
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collaboration with private industry: where there is potential to com-
mercialize basic research, biomedical companies would continue to 
license the rights to university discoveries.  Thus, the AUTM’s moti-
vations in opposing the proposed research exemption are suspect.  
They appear to reflect either a misunderstanding of the purpose be-
hind granting property rights to publicly funded university research, or 
an improper alignment with industry goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our genetic makeup is far too complicated for a single entity to 
hold the keys to any given gene and to be able to choose when, if ever, 
to share.1 
 
Gene patenting has created great controversy since its inception 
only two decades ago.  Exclusive rights over strands of nucleotides 
allow patentees to bar basic research on small but critically important 
sequences of the genome, creating logjams in genetic research and 
  
 1 Joseph Stiglitz & John Sulston, The Case Against Gene Patents, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 16, 2010, at A19. 
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slowing the progress of developing and administering diagnostics and 
gene-targeting therapeutics.  Debates over the merits of gene patents 
have been heated, most recently illustrated by an unprecedented in-
validation of several broad patents covering all variations and use of 
two genes linked to breast and ovarian cancers.2  Although this ruling 
was reversed in part, it, along with the dissenting opinion to its rever-
sal, demonstrates clear judicial recognition that the problems associ-
ated with gene patenting merit serious attention.   
Fortunately, given the volatility in judicial treatment of gene pat-
ents,3 reducing the barriers to research and clinical care does not re-
quire judicial invalidation of gene patents.  Rather, statutory exemp-
tions to infringement liability can, and have, ameliorated problematic 
uses of patent enforcement power.  A recent proposal, put forth by the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS), puts forth an 
exemption from liability for infringement that occurs in the course of 
research.4  This exemption would promote basic research by granting 
academic scientists unfettered access to genetic material.  The pro-
posal does not alter the patentability of gene sequences; it merely re-
stricts patentees from using infringement threats to stop research.   
Surprisingly, the Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM), an organization responsible for promoting the commerciali-
zation of basic research, opposes such an exemption.  The AUTM 
alleges that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incen-
tive for private firms to invest in upstream discoveries made in uni-
versity laboratories.  Yet the exemption would do the opposite: by 
opening the doors to research relating to any gene segment, a research 
exemption would accelerate basic research.  Moreover, it would not 
affect collaboration with private industry: where there is potential to 
commercialize basic research, biomedical companies will continue to 
license the rights to university discoveries.  Thus, the AUTM’s moti-
  
 2 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 3 Compare id. (reasoning that the USPTO’s treatment of isolated DNA as 
patentable subject matter reflects nothing more than a “lawyers trick”) with Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 3211513, at 
*6-8 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (concluding that isolated DNA has a “distinctive 
chemical identity and nature” and is thus appropriately patent eligible subject matter) 
and id. at *75-76, *117-18 (reasoning that isolated DNA is “not materially different 
from … native genes” and thus “analogous to the ‘new mineral discovered in the 
earth,’ or the ‘new plant found in the wild’”) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).  
 4 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S, GENE PATENTS & LICENSING PRACTICES & THEIR IMPACT 
ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 4 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report]. 
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vations in opposing the proposed research exemption are suspect.  
They appear to reflect either a misunderstanding of the purpose be-
hind granting property rights to publicly funded university research,5 
or an improper alignment with industry goals. 
This article examines the challenges gene patenting has presented 
for basic research, the proposed exemption that seeks to ameliorate 
them, and the AUTM’s unfounded objection to this proposal.  Part I 
discusses why patents on gene sequences are unique, both in sub-
stance and source.  The patentability of nucleotides and the fruits of 
university research are relatively recent innovations in U.S. law, and 
commercial rights to both are strictly limited in other nations.  Part II 
discusses the chilling effect of unfettered enforcement power, as well 
as the recent invalidation of several notorious gene patents, and the 
Federal Circuit’s divided response.  Then, noting that judicial invali-
dation of gene patents was short-lived, Part III discusses statutory 
means of ameliorating problems caused by gene patents.  In particular, 
it discusses the SACGHS’ proposed exemption from infringement 
liability for the use of patented sequences in research.  Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the AUTM’s response to the SACGHS’ proposed exemption.  
Finding that the AUTM’s concerns are exaggerated and unfounded, it 
queries whether the AUTM’s motivations in opposing the exemption 
reflect a misunderstanding of its implications or an improper align-
ment with the biomedical industry.   
 
I. PATENTING GENE SEQUENCES: GRANTING 
EXCLUSIVITY OVER INFORMATION AS OLD AS 
TIME 
 
A generation ago, the prevailing wisdom was that the best way to 
assure full utilization of publicly-sponsored research results for the 
public good was to make them freely available to the public. Today, 
federal policy reflects the opposite assumption.6 
 
Treating gene sequences as patentable subject matter is not a 
foregone conclusion under the language of the Patent Act7 or the his-
tory of case law interpreting it.  Additionally, because the isolation of 
  
 5 As afforded by the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–204 (2011).  See 
infra Part I.B.  
 6 Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools and the Law, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS & THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 6, 7-8 (1997), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5758&page=6. 
 7 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2011). 
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gene segments generally occurs in university laboratories, the dispute 
surrounding gene patents extends to the social utility of privatizing 
publicly funded research.  This part briefly reviews the rationale be-
hind the patentability of gene sequences, noting that criticisms of this 
rationale are ample and the state of the law is tenuous, as a recent 
court ruling illustrates.  It then turns to the source of gene discover-
ies—academic research—to discuss why the patentability of publicly 
funded discoveries is itself unique and controversial. 
A.  Gene Sequences as Patentable Subject Matter  
 
The discovery of gene sequences is a relatively new phenomenon 
in biomedical research; the first gene patent was issued in 1982.8  
Thus, judicial interpretation of the Patent Act as it applies to genetic 
information is relatively recent, and increasingly controversial.  Rec-
ognizing gene sequences as patentable subject matter over which 
owners have unfettered enforcement power has allowed patent owners 
to halt publicly funded research as well as diagnostic care, creating 
substantial frustration among patients, clinicians, and scientists, and 
leading to a recent unprecedented judicial limitation of these intellec-
tual property rights.9    
Patented gene sequences stretch the boundaries of intellectual 
property law because they provide exclusivity over “the most basic 
information,”10 rather than over “product[s] of human ingenuity.”11  
However, patentees argue that because a gene patent claims an iso-
lated form of DNA, the resulting property right is tied to a sequence 
that is not naturally occurring (e.g., requires human intervention and is 
thus patentable subject matter).12  Indeed, the Supreme Court has been 
clear that the bounds of patentable subject matter are to be construed 
  
 8 Gene Patents and Global Competition Issues: Protection of Biotechnology 
Under Patent Law, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Jan. 1, 2006), 
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/gene-patents-and-global-competition-
issues/1163/. 
 9 See infra Part II.C. 
 10 Stiglitz & Sulston, supra note 1, at A19. 
 11 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 12 Patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”  
35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that genes are chemical com-
pounds, and thus not products of nature when isolated from other DNA, was critical 
to finding that gene sequences were patentable subject matter.  Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A gene is a chemical com-
pound.”); see also Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in the United 
States, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 989, 989 (2007) (chronicling the patentability of 
genetic material).  
144 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 139]  
broadly, so as to encourage economically productive efforts.13  Thus 
far, the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) has treated isolated 
sequences as such, granting patents so long as they have not yet been 
claimed,14 are not obvious to one skilled in the “art” of genetics,15 and 
can be described in detail.16 
Nonetheless, the patentability of gene sequences is both contro-
versial and potentially fragile.  The United States is unique in granting 
gene patent holders unlimited enforcement power; nearly every other 
high-income nation has tempered a gene patentee’s ability to constrain 
research or clinical care.17  The unfettered approach taken by the 
United States has created a multitude of problems, both in genetic 
research and patient care.18  In response, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York recently invalidated seven broad pat-
ents claiming the composition and diagnostic use of two genes related 
to breast and ovarian cancers.19  Although the Court accepted the 
powerful arguments put forth by patient, clinician, and research advo-
  
 13 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). 
 14 A discovery must be novel to the relevant art in order for a patent to issue.  
35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 15 A discovery must be non-obvious “to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art,” in order for a patent to issue.  35 U.S.C. § 103.  This requirement may be of 
growing importance to the Federal Circuit.  See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379–82 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority erred in using util-
ity, rather than non-obviousness, to invalidate a patent on expressed sequence tags). 
 16 A discovery must be described in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art … to make and use the same,” in order for a 
patent to issue.  35 U.S.C. § 112.  The utility of a gene—its function as a protein-
encoding piece of information—must also be disclosed in a claim. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 
1379 (holding that a gene sequence is not patentable subject matter if its utility is not 
yet known).   
 17 The majority of high-income nations prohibit patents on medical processes 
and diagnostics. Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 
287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 308 (2008) (describing prohibitions on medi-
cal process patents); Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner ‘Proc-
ess’ Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 70 (1999) (noting that diagnostics are not patentable in most 
other nations).  Moreover, most limit the strength of patents by explicitly providing 
for the use of compulsory licensing to promote public health.  SACGHS Report, 
supra note 4, at 81-87; see also JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, 
UNCTAD—ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., NON-VOLUNTARY 
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA, 12 
(2003) (noting that the United States’ lack of statutory authority to issue compulsory 
licenses is unusual). 
 18 See infra Part II. 
 19 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see infra Part II.C.  
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cacy groups, the Federal Circuit reversed many of them (and the par-
ties continue to appeal), reflecting the volatility of gene patenting.20    
B.  Basic Research as Patentable Subject Matter 
 
The patentability of gene sequencing is unique not only because 
of the naturally-occurring subject matter involved, but also because 
the discoveries claimed in a gene patent generally stem from publicly 
funded university research.  The right to privatize products of publicly 
funded research is well established—and indeed predates the pat-
entability of genetic material—but is just as controversial as gene pat-
enting itself.  This section turns to the law that affords universities 
ownership over the fruits of federally-funded work.  While the valid-
ity of university-owned patents is not in question, the efficacy of this 
legislation in stimulating drug development is, at best, uncertain. 
All recent genetic research is based, at least in part, on the fifteen 
billion dollar publicly funded Human Genome Project.21  Moreover, 
the basic research involved in identifying a given gene’s potential 
diagnostic or therapeutic value is conducted in large part by publicly 
funded academic scientists.22  These researchers are able to patent this 
work under the Bayh-Dole Act (Bayh-Dole), enacted in 1980 to grant 
universities ownership over federally-funded discoveries.23  Seeking 
to stimulate private investment in basic research, Bayh-Dole was in-
tended to arm universities with exclusive rights over upstream devel-
opments that could be licensed to private industry for commercializa-
tion.24  Since then, universities have secured thousands of patents25 
and entered into licensing contracts with the majority of the members 
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization.26  Private industry has 
  
 20 See infra Part II; John Conley & Dan Vorhaus, Pigs Fly: Federal Court 
Invalidates Myriad’s Patent Claims, GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/03/30/pigs-fly-federal-court-
invalidates-myriads-patent-claims. 
 21 Nicholas Thompson, Gene Blues: Is the Patent Office Prepared to Deal 
with the Genomic Revolution?, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 9, 14. 
 22 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2 n.5 (noting that over half of basic 
research funding came from the federal government in 2006).  
 23 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2011). 
 24 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 28; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 
280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); Klein, supra note 13, at 989. 
 25 Klein, supra note 13, at 989. 
 26 Letter from James C. Greenwood, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Bio-
technology Industry Organization, et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Serv’s 2 (Feb. 4, 2010), 
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invested in the commercialization of over one hundred drugs, vac-
cines, and in vitro devices initially developed in university laborato-
ries.27   
Despite increased commercialization of basic research, it is not 
clear that Bayh-Dole has increased utilization of publicly funded re-
search.  Not only does public funding account for a large portion of 
“bench to bedside” developments (reducing the need for private in-
vestment in basic research),28 but Bayh-Dole itself has also compli-
cated basic research in five ways that appear to slow, and sometimes 
preclude, biomedical progress.  First, patenting basic research has 
created overlapping claims to gene segments.  Researchers must navi-
gate through a “patent thicket” before performing work on a gene 
implicated by one or more claims.29  Second, unfettered licensing 
freedom has resulted in universities exclusively licensing patented 
gene sequences.  This has created monopolistic authority over several 
genes—which precludes research on, and testing for, gene muta-
tions.30  Third, exclusively-licensed gene patents have prohibited other 
university researchers from using basic nucleic acid sequences as re-
search tools.31  Fourth, universities have allocated resources towards 
expensive litigation to enforce their exclusively licensed patents.32  
Finally, under Bayh-Dole, researchers face conflicting sets of incen-
tives from the patent and academic publishing systems.  Once encour-
aged to disclose findings immediately in a peer-reviewed journal, re-
searchers who seek to patent their findings must refrain from publish-
  
http://essentialmedicine.org/sites/default/files/archive/SACGHSsign-onletter2-4-
2010final_000.pdf. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Public funding of biomedical research increased by over 20 billion dollars 
since the late 1970s, contributing to the increase in therapeutics and diagnostics 
brought to market.  Klein, supra note 13, at 989. 
 29 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699. 
 30 The majority of diagnostic monopolies originate from university-owned 
patents.  Letter from Ethan Guillen, Executive Director, Universities Allied for Essen-
tial Medicines, and David Watkins, Coordinating Committee Member, Universities 
Allied for Essential Medicines, to Arundeep Pradhan, President, AUTM 2 (Mar. 17, 
2010), 
http://essentialmedicine.org/sites/default/files/UAEM_AUTM_final%2020100317_0.
pdf. 
 31 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the 
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 292–93 (2003) (noting 
that the patent on primate embryonic stem cell lines includes exclusivity over all 
human embryonic stem cell lines). 
 32 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) aff’d, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment based on lack of written description and enablement after 
university filed infringement action against pharmaceutical company). 
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ing results until a claim is within a year of being filed with the 
USPTO.33 
There is substantial evidence that these five unexpected effects of 
Bayh-Dole have hindered research, contrary to the spirit of the legisla-
tion.34  Indeed, Bayh-Dole provides that universities should license the 
rights to their patents without “unduly encumbering future research 
and discovery.”35  Yet Bayh-Dole provides little oversight authority to 
ensure this occurs: the law does not restrict licensing agreements,36 
and the National Institutes of Health has little authority to interfere 
with a licensing agreement that appears to restrict access.37  In other 
words, university patenting practices that encumber future research 
violate the principles behind Bayh-Dole, but are neither expressly 
prohibited nor actively deterred.  Part II discusses the extent to which 
gene patenting has, indeed, hindered research.  
 
II. THE EFFECT OF A GENE PATENT ON RESEARCH 
 
[T]he scope of patents on DNA sequences evolved from patents on 
gene-constructs encoding therapeutic proteins, to patents on DNA 
sequences including not only their therapeutic utility in encoding the 
protein, but also the application of the knowledge regarding a gene 
sequence in diagnosis and research.38  
  
 33 Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Bio-
medical Research, in 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECONOMY 1, 14 (Adam B. Jafee et. 
al. eds., 2007). 
 34 See infra Part II.  
 35 35 U.S.C. § 200.  
 36 Federally-funded university research is not subject to the same licensing 
restrictions as are research developments that come out of federal agencies.  For ex-
ample, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 prohibits licensing an invention 
to private industry without public notice and a determination that the license will 
neither substantially limit competition nor create an unreasonable period of exclusiv-
ity. SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 77-78.   
 37 For example, the National Institutes of Health may exercise “march-in 
rights” and reclaim title to a patent if a patented invention is not being licensed in a 
way which furthers the goals of Bayh-Dole.  Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32 at 294.  
While march-in rights are not limited to being exercised under “exceptional circum-
stances,” the government will not own the patent until: (1) the Secretary of Commerce 
approves the NIH’s determination that seizure is necessary to promote the objectives 
of Bayh-Dole, and (2) the patentee has exhausted (and been unsuccessful in) an ap-
peal of said determination.  Id. at 293-94.  These processes take years, and the NIH 
has never “marched-in” to seize a patent.  Id. at 294. 
 38 Birgit Verbeure, Gert Matthijs & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Analyzing DNA 
Patents in Relation with Diagnostic Genetic Testing, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 26, 
26 (2006). 
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Claims on gene sequences not only stretch the boundaries of pat-
entable subject matter, but also slow basic research.  Patentees have 
threatened potential or actual infringers with cease and desist letters, 
leading researchers and laboratories to abandon projects relating to 
patented genes.  This section discusses how this activity, along with 
the use of diagnostic monopolies to prohibit clinicians from offering 
comprehensive testing services, has led to widespread frustration 
amongst scientists, clinicians, and patient advocates.  Indeed, gene 
patents have hindered basic research so substantially that researchers 
have fostered a culture of acceptable infringement.  Finally, this sec-
tion turns to the recent invalidation of seven gene patents, a clear judi-
cial recognition that untempered enforcement power currently af-
forded to gene patentees is problematic at best.   
A.  A Chilling Effect  
 
Unfettered genetic research has the capacity to move quickly: the 
American College of Medical Genetics attributes what are “usually 
very rapid improvement[s]” to diagnostic tests to “the addition of new 
mutations or the use of new techniques by numerous laboratories that 
have accumulated samples from affected individuals over many 
years.”39  Gene patents, however, limit this work, prohibiting all but a 
few laboratories from collecting patient samples, identifying new mu-
tations, and refining the accuracy and scope of a given test.  In other 
words, diagnostic monopolies not only hinder patient access,40 but 
also preclude researchers from developing alternative or improved 
versions of a test.41  Two characteristics of gene patents deter re-
search: (1) the high transaction costs associated with licensing the 
rights to a patented gene; and (2) the breadth of gene patents, which 
often encompass both the gene itself and the method of searching for 
unusual sequences. 
  
 39 Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics Exec. Comm., American College of Medical 
Genetics Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing, 1 
GENETICS MEDICINE 237 (1999), available at 
www.acmg.net/StaticContent/StaticPages/Gene_Patents.pdf [hereinafter ACMG 
Position Statement].   
 40 Diagnostic monopolies hinder patient access when patentees do not accept 
all forms of insurance coverage.  For example, Myriad did not allow its laboratories to 
accept Medicaid reimbursement, meaning that Medicaid beneficiaries could not ac-
cess BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests without paying the 3,000 cost out-of-pocket.  More 
Harm than Good? Patenting Genes is Bad for Diagnosis, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010, 
at 90–91.   
 41 See Klein, supra note 13, at 990; More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, 
at 91. 
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1.  Transaction Costs Associated with Licensing 
 
Although researchers can theoretically license the right to conduct 
research on a patented gene, the number of patents on various gene 
sequences has made this a practical impossibility for many scientists.  
Heller and Eisenberg have attributed the prohibitive transaction costs 
involved in licensing negotiations to four factors.42  First, parties from 
both public and private industry often have stakes in gene patents.  
Negotiating agreeable terms is complicated by the divergent motiva-
tions of these parties.  Second, researchers in the public sector have 
limited bargaining power in negotiations with sophisticated private 
firms.  Third, predicting the future value of a gene sequence in a later 
discovery is impossible, and each party is likely to overestimate its 
own prospective contribution.  Finally, researchers must navigate 
through a “patent thicket” merely to find the patentee with whom to 
begin licensing negotiations.  Patent owners can then demand reach-
through license agreements on their sequences, guaranteeing them a 
royalty on every development that stems from research on those 
genes.  A researcher seeking to use a gene segment on which multiple 
parties have claims would then have to negotiate with multiple private 
parties with varying commercial interests.43 
2.  Broad Patent Claims 
 
Gene patents are problematic for researchers because they are ex-
tremely broad: many claims cover all variations in a gene sequence, 
and association patents claim all methods by which one could look for 
new mutations.44  In other words, diagnostic patents preclude any 
comparison of a patient’s DNA with a patented sequence.45  Such 
broad patents on gene sequences have four implications for genetic 
research.  First, association patents slow data collection by precluding 
unlicensed laboratories from testing patients for mutations of interest.  
Second, these patents impede others from improving a diagnostic test 
  
 42 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 700. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Verbeure et al., supra note 39, at 32. 
 45 Klein, supra note 13, at 990.  For example, Myriad owns BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, and the Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute owns the gene causing 
aspartoacylase deficiency, or Canavan disease.  See also Stiglitz & Sulston, supra 
note 1, at A19 (“Myriad had total control over the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes since 
the 1990s.  No other companies have been able to do research on the genes without 
Myriad’s permission.”); Verbeure et al., supra note 39, at 32; Gregory P. Lekovic, 
Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A Proposal to Amend ‘The Phy-
sician Immunity Statute,’ 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 275, 288 (2004). 
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or expanding its scope.  Third, claims on gene fragments encumber 
the development of multiplex testing and whole genome sequencing.  
Finally, gene patents obstruct any research that might implicate a 
claimed sequence, even as it relates to issues in which the patentee is 
ostensibly uninterested. 
Association patents detract from research by slowing data collec-
tion.  Gene patents allow patent owners to shut down extant testing, 
even that which was in place before the patentee filed its claim.46  
Patentees have used cease and desist letters to demand that clinicians 
either stop offering a diagnostic test or pay royalties for each test ad-
ministered.47  For example, the owner of the Duchenne muscular dys-
trophy gene patent, Thermo Fisher Scientific, forced university medi-
cal centers to stop testing patients for the disorder.48  Athena Diagnos-
tics, the exclusive licensee of the patented methods used to diagnose 
Alzheimer’s disease, has prohibited other labs from offering the test.49  
Even the possibility of infringement is sufficient to shut down a labo-
ratory: in a survey of university diagnostic laboratories, the College of 
American Pathologists found that 48 percent had stopped performing 
or developing a diagnostic because of potential infringement liabil-
ity.50  
The second way in which gene sequence patents slow research is 
by impeding others from expanding on or improving a diagnostic test.  
Patentees cannot only stop unlicensed laboratories from using a pat-
ent-protected test, but also can block development of variations 
thereon. This precludes researchers from using verification testing to 
identify false positives or negatives in an extant test,51 as well as from 
developing variants to test different sample types. For example, the 
Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute not only used cease and 
desist letters to prohibit laboratories from testing for the Canavan 
gene, but also to stop any research relating to it, declaring that it 
  
 46 Brendan Borrell, Lawsuit Rekindles Gene-Patent Debate, 436 NATURE 413 
(2010). 
 47 Amy Dockser Marcus, Licenses Drive Gene Debate, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 
15, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303348504575184103022053956.ht
ml. 
 48 Id. 
 49 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21, 32, 41, 56. 
 50 Lekovic, supra note 46, at 291. 
 51 Talk of the Nation: Breast Cancer Gene Patents Challenged (NPR radio 
broadcast Dec. 11, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=121343433) (inter-
viewing Daniel Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation). 
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would “enforce vigorously” its patents.52  Evidence of such impedi-
ments is not merely anecdotal: systematic review of the number of 
academic publications relating to continued research on patented ge-
netic sequences reveals that gene patents are strongly associated with 
decreased follow-on research.53  Moreover, a survey of laboratory 
researchers found that almost 50 percent have avoided test develop-
ment out of fear of an infringement action, and 25 percent have aban-
doned an already developed test.54  
Third, gene patents have slowed research by hindering the devel-
opment of multiplex testing and whole-genome sequencing.  Multi-
plex testing offers patients several diagnostic services at once, and 
thus implicates a multitude of potentially patented sequences.55  Simi-
larly, whole-genome sequencing will soon allow clinicians to examine 
all of a patient’s genetic material, potentially looking for every identi-
fiably harmful mutation in one sweep56—and implicating “hundreds 
or thousands of patents already issued and exclusively licensed gene 
by gene.”57  To develop either type of test without infringement, a 
researcher must negotiate and agree to royalties on any number of 
patented gene sequences.  The resulting test might be more expensive 
than the cumulative cost of each individual diagnostic.58  In other 
words, gene patents may eliminate the efficiencies offered by multi-
plex or whole genome sequencing.  The only alternative to such ex-
pensive negotiations is to conduct comprehensive testing at the risk of 
facing an infringement suit.  Emory University, for example, offers 
“chromosomal microarrays,” tests that detect a number of chromoso-
  
 52 Lekovic, supra note 45, at 292 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 30, Ex. A, Green-
berg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002)). 
 53 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2, 27 (citing Kenneth G. Huang & 
Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowl-
edge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193 (2009) (presenting 
empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between patents and follow-on research 
on a particular gene and concluding that patent ownership “fragmentation is … prob-
lematic for follow-on contributors to the public knowledge stream [and] … the nega-
tive effect of patents on follow-on public knowledge production is greatest for genes 
closely linked to human disease”). 
 54 Thompson, supra note 22, at 14. 
 55 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 12; Andrew Pollack, After Patent on 
Genes Is Rejected, Taking Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B1. 
 56 Marcus, supra note 48. 
 57 Id. (quoting Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of the Center for Genome 
Ethics, Law & Policy); see also More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 91 
(“[G]ranting patents on individual genes … leads to ‘fragmented ownership of the 
genome’ that will interfere with the progress of whole-genome sequencing.”). 
 58 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 51-52 (noting that anticipated “royalty 
stacking” is likely to deter researchers from developing multiplex testing).  
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mal abnormalities, many of which occur on patented genes.59  Some 
of the results the University reports to patients directly implicate pat-
ents for which Emory has not negotiated licenses. 60  Thus, according 
to the director of the medical-genetics department, “[e]verybody is a 
little bit nervous because of the legal situation of whether or not what 
we are doing would be viewed as infringement.”61  This approach is 
precarious: any given patent holder could effectively shut down the 
testing with an infringement action.62  Although the Supreme Court 
has hinted that a court may refuse to grant injunctive relief to a “hold-
out” patentee who refused to agree to reasonable licensing terms, 
there is no guarantee that an infringement challenge to a multiplex test 
would be so resolved.63 
Finally, gene patents obstruct research that potentially implicates 
a claimed sequence, such as searching for a receptor site for a thera-
peutic or studying a rare disease associated with a patented fragment.  
In other words, gene patents preclude all unlicensed research on 
claimed segments, even those in which the patentee has no stake.  
  
 59 Marcus, supra note 48. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. (quoting David Ledbetter, Director of Emory University School of 
Medicine medical-genetics department).  
 62 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 52. 
 63 The Supreme Court has hinted at—but not ruled on—the possibility that a 
court could appropriately prohibit a “holdout” patentee from demanding unreasonable 
royalties by refusing to grant said patentee injunctive relief from the defendant’s 
infringement.  The Court eliminated the Federal Circuit’s bright line rule requiring 
injunctive relief upon showing of patent validity and infringement, but the intimation 
that damages would be appropriate in a holdout appears in a concurring opinion only, 
and is not sufficient to provide a multiplex test developer with assurance that a court 
would protect its continued existence.  See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 394 (2006) (“[T]he decision whether to grant of deny injunctive relief rests 
within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and … such discretion must be 
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity. . . .”); see also id. at 396-97 
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . When the 
patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement 
and an injunction may not serve the public interest. . . .”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 52-53 (“[A] multiplex developer does not 
learn until after lengthy and expensive litigation is concluded whether an injunction 
will issue.”); Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially 
Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 
1043 (2008) (arguing that the eBay decision has minimal implications for the bio-
medical arena, because courts are always likely to grant injunctive relief where the 
parties are competitors in the marketplace).  
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Because gene sequences “open the door to future discoveries,”64 the 
scope of this limitation is indefinite.  For example, therapeutic re-
search requires screening multiple gene fragments as potential recep-
tor sites, or using several expressed sequence tags to identify the 
genes that code for potentially therapeutic proteins.65  A researcher 
who cannot negotiate the licenses to every patented segment or se-
quence tag must risk infringement, forgo testing patented receptor 
sites, or abandon the research all together.66  Researchers are particu-
larly likely to abstain from work on rare diseases that implicate pat-
ented sequences, as the cost of negotiating one or more licenses is 
often greater than the expected returns on the resulting diagnostic test 
or therapeutic.67  For example, the president of Gene Dx, a company 
that develops diagnostics for rare genetic diseases, reports that he is 
least likely to seek the rights to develop testing for a disease linked to 
a patented gene.68  Finally, patent owners can use reach-through li-
cense agreements to abort a licensee’s research that it views as un-
profitable.69  DuPont explicitly reserves this “veto power” in licensing 
terms that govern basic research using its genetically engineered 
mice.70   
B.  A System of Rational Forbearance 
 
The extent to which gene patenting interferes with basic research 
is substantial.  To be sure, genetic research is only unfettered if gene 
sequences are widely licensed (e.g., the genetic sequence for cystic 
fibrosis)71 or placed in the public domain (e.g., the genetic sequence 
for Tay-Sachs).72  In contrast, where gene patents are exclusively li-
censed or not licensed at all, researchers and clinicians must—and 
  
 64 Rebecca Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the 
Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 786–87 (2000). 
 65 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699. 
 66 Id. 
 67 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 51. 
 68 Id. at 30 (“Gene patents have a severe negative impact on the develop-
ment, and thus the availability, of genetic testing for rare disorders. . . . I can assure 
the committee that any gene on which there is patent protection falls to the very bot-
tom of my quite extensive list of genetic tests in which my company is interested.”). 
 69 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699.  A reach-through license 
agreement allows the patent holder to demand royalties or exert control over future 
discoveries made with the use of a patented gene sequence.  Stephen G. Kunin, et al., 
Reach-Through Claims in the Age of Biotechnology, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 609, 618 
(2002).  
 70 Id. at 699-700. 
 71 Marcus, supra note 48; SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2. 
 72 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21. 
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do—knowingly infringe patents.73  Private industry rarely challenges 
this behavior; indeed, further research often increases the value of a 
patent at no cost to the patentee, and the use of cease and desist letters 
against university researchers generally tarnishes a company’s reputa-
tion.74  Still, where industry is commercially threatened (e.g., by an 
unlicensed laboratory offering a diagnostic test), it is quick to exercise 
its enforcement power to preserve exclusivity over the uses of a gene 
fragment.  As discussed above, this has drastic consequences, both for 
research and patient care.  In other words, researchers cannot rely on 
patentees exercising rational forbearance if their work may prove 
commercially valuable down the line.  The most infamous enforce-
ment example has led to the groundbreaking litigation of several pat-
ents covering two genes: BRCA1 and BRCA2.  
C.  Letting the “Gene Patent Horse Out of the Barn”75  
 
Research and clinical care problems stemming from gene patent-
ing have long been flagged as untenable.  Recently, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York broke with precedent and in-
validated two of the most notorious patents, striking down both com-
position and process claims76 on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.77  
The Federal Circuit reversed this invalidation in part, issuing a split 
decision reflective of the intensity of the controversy over gene pat-
enting.  This section reviews why these gene patents have stirred such 
controversy, and how both the district court and Federal Circuit 
treated them under the Patent Act.  Because the decisions do not sig-
nal the end of gene patenting, the need for legislative remedies re-
mains great. 
Patents covering BRCA1 and BRCA2 have become infamous in 
the gene patenting debate: mutations on these genes are associated 
with increased risk for breast and ovarian cancers (60 and 15−40 per-
  
 73 John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the 
Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Conley & Vorhaus, supra note 21. 
 76 Composition (or product) patent claims encompass rights to the gene se-
quence itself, while process patent claims encompass rights to the method of using the 
sequence as a diagnostic tool.  See e.g., USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE: CHAPTER 2100 PATENTABILITY 2100-9 (8th ed. rev. 2007), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r6_2100.pdf. 
 77 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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cent, respectively),78 and early detection has substantial implications 
for prognosis and care.79  The University of Utah Research Founda-
tion owns seven broad patents on these genes, covering all sequence 
variations and diagnostic methods used on them.80  Myriad Genetics, 
the exclusive licensee of these rights (and an offshoot of Utah’s Cen-
ter of Excellence Program),81 has actively used cease and desist letters 
to shut down any competing laboratory offering BRCA1 or BRCA2 
screening, even those offering a test that Myriad does not perform.82  
As a result, verification testing is not available and research focused 
on improving the tests has been eliminated (even though Myriad’s 
version of the test has a twelve percent error rate).83  Moreover, only a 
limited range of sample types may be tested,84 and Myriad does not 
accept all insurance plans and has not been able to secure coverage by 
Medicaid in 50 percent of states.85  Thus, many patients have not been 
able to access the tests, despite recommendations from their genetic 
counselors.86  The breadth of these patents, and the problems they 
created, formed the ideal basis for a legal challenge to the validity of 
gene patenting itself, a USPTO practice that the medical profession 
has contested for years.87 
  
 78 BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 2 http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/Fs3_62.pdf (last reviewed 
May 29, 2009). 
 79 More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 90; see also Borrell, supra note 
47 (noting that BRCA mutations account for the majority of cases of inherited breast 
cancer). 
 80 Borrell, supra note 47. 
 81 Myriad was established to commercialize research conducted at the Uni-
versity of Utah and has a close relationship with the institution.  Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., UNIV. OF UTAH TECH. VENTURE DEV. (Nov 18, 2005), 
http://www.techventures.utah.edu/Documents/OtherCommercializationStories/Myria
d.pdf. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, 
CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1386 
(2006). 
 84 Borrell, supra note 47. 
 85 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 86 Id. 
 87 The American Medical Association, the American College of Medical 
Genetics, and the College of American Pathologists each assert that broad gene pat-
ents run afoul of section 101.  See Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal to Amend 
the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to Allow Health Care Providers to Examine Their 
Patients’ DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 471, 500–01 (2002) (quoting ACMG Position 
Statement, supra note 39).  In 2007, a House bill proposed to expressly prohibit gene 
patenting.  Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).    
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In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office88 (Myriad I), the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York invalidated both the composition and process patents 
covering the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, reasoning that genes are 
products of nature and thus beyond the scope of patentable subject 
matter.89  The analysis behind this decision is notably different from 
other case law: the Myriad I Court rejected the premise that genetic 
material is a chemical that, when isolated, is “markedly different” 
from a gene existing in nature.90  Rather, the Court concluded that 
gene sequences are strings of the same information—whether in vivo 
or vitro.91  On appeal, the dissenting judge on the Federal Circuit 
agreed, for the most part, with the district court’s reasoning, but the 
majority of the three judge panel did not, resulting in a reversal of 
most of the district court’s holdings.  Notwithstanding the ultimate 
outcome of the case, which remains to be seen,92 the palpable tension 
between varying judicial interpretations of the patentability of genes 
reflects the malleability of patent law as it applies to the biopharma-
ceutical industry.  Thus, analysis of both courts’ treatment of the va-
lidity of Myriad’s composition and process patents warrants analysis. 
The district court narrowed the focus of analysis for the pat-
entability of gene segments to § 101 of the Patent Act, whereas prior 
scrutiny had incorporated the novelty and non-obviousness require-
ments of §§ 102 and 103, respectively.93  In other words, no court had 
explicitly held that patents on gene segments meet the threshold re-
  
 88 See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
 89 Id. 
 90 The defendants argued that an isolated gene is different from a naturally 
occurring gene because it is “substantially separated from other cellular components 
which naturally accompany a native human sequence [such as] human genome se-
quences and proteins.”  Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 
5,693,473 col.19 1.6-15 (filed June 7, 1995)).  The Court rejected this argument, 
finding that the “purification of a product of nature, without more, cannot transform it 
into patentable subject matter.  Rather, the purified product must possess ‘markedly 
different characteristics’ in order to satisfy the requirements.”  Id. at 227 (citing Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)).  
 91 Id. at 232; Pollack, supra note 56. 
 92 Both parties have filed petitions for a rehearing by the three judge panel.  
Defendant-Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing at 11, Myriad II, 2011 WL 
3211513 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057015 at *11; Plain-
tiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing at 1, Myriad II, 2011 WL 3211513 (Fed. 
Cir. July 29, 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057016 at *1. 
 93 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
1991).  The Federal Circuit has also examined gene patents under § 101, but has 
narrowed in on the utility element of that section.  In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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quirements of § 101 itself,94 which the district court concluded do 
not.95  The Federal Circuit, in a 3-2 decision, both agreed and dis-
agreed.  The majority adopted Myriad’s arguments,96 concluding that 
the act of cleaving DNA from its native source met the requirements 
of § 101, seemingly relying on the utility of the isolated genes in find-
ing that the same nucleotide sequences could be “markedly different” 
from native DNA (e.g., pointing to protein synthesis and transgenic 
animals as fruits of manmade labor).97  Although writing for the ma-
jority, Judge Lourie stood alone in this conclusion.  Neither Judge 
Moore nor Judge Bryson, concurring and dissenting, respectively, 
adopted his reasoning that gene segments are patent eligible under § 
101.  Indeed, both declared Myriad’s patent on DNA segments of 
fifteen or more nucleotides are not patent eligible, being distinct from 
native DNA in neither features nor utility.98  Nonetheless, Judge 
Moore concurred in the opinion merely to preserve the property right 
expectations of patent holders.99   In his dissent, Judge Bryson appro-
priately chided such reasoning, noting that there is no “collective right 
of adverse possession to intellectual property, and [the court] should 
not create such a right.”100   Indeed, Bryson harshly criticized the ma-
jority, noting that it improperly defers to the USPTO’s Utility Exami-
  
 94 The Federal Circuit has not decided whether isolated DNA is an un-
patentable product of nature under § 101 alone, although one judge has at least ques-
tioned the idea.  Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 95 The Myriad I court concluded that DNA strands are “unpatentable prod-
ucts of nature” because the “defining characteristic of DNA” (information coding) is 
the same in both native and isolated forms.  It went so far as to describe Myriad’s 
contention that isolated DNA is “markedly different” from native DNA as a mere 
“lawyer’s trick.” Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185, 229. 
 96 Amici analogized the Myriad case to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 309-10 (1980) (holding that a man-made micro-organism is patentable subject 
matter because it is “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of mat-
ter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use’ 
and distinguishing the subject matter from un-patentable bacterium in part because of 
its ‘potential for significant utility.’”) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 
615 (1886)).  See Brief for Rosetta Genomics, Ltd., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellants, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 
4853324, at *21-22; Brief for Univ. of New Hampshire School of Law as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (2011) (No. 
2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853318, at *10.  
 97 Myriad II, No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 3211513, at *17 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 
2011). 
 98 Id. at *21 (Moore, J., concurring); Id. at *38-40 (Bryson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 99 Id. at *32 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 100 Id. at *45 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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nation Guidelines (stating that isolated DNA is patentable subject 
matter),101 and mocking the reasoning behind the court’s ruling:   
 
[T]o argue that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable 
because in its native environment it is part of a much 
larger structure is no more persuasive than arguing that 
although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic 
particle is patentable because it was previously part of 
a larger structure, or that while a tree is not patentable, 
a limb of the tree becomes a patentable invention when 
it is removed from the tree.102  
 
The district court’s invalidation of the BRCA gene patents is sig-
nificant, along with Judge Bryson’s dissent to the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal, even if both amount to no more than short-lived judicial ac-
knowledgement of the substantial problems posed by gene patents.  
Contrary to the rampant disagreement regarding Myriad’s compo-
sition patents, both the district court and Federal Circuit invalidated its 
process patents as unpatentable abstract mental processes103 under the 
Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation test.”104 If the Supreme 
Court hears the case, it will have to determine whether the Federal 
Circuit was correct to rely on this test, or whether it should have cre-
ated a new (presumably more lenient) test as the Court recently in-
sinuated would be appropriate in the context of “advanced diagnostic 
medicine techniques.”105  Unless the Court rules otherwise, however, 
judicial agreement in this context suggests stability with regard to the 
patent eligibility of diagnostic mental processes.    
Regardless of the final outcome of litigation pertaining to gene 
patents, the research barriers associated with extant patents will per-
sist.  Thus, legislative solutions to these problems are critical.  Part III 
  
 101 Id. at *44-45; see also USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).  
 102 Myriad II, 2011 WL 3211513, at *41 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 103 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (“[B]ecause the claimed comparisons 
of DNA sequences are abstract mental processes, they also constitute unpatentable 
subject matter.”).  
 104 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954-55 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “the sole 
test” for determining whether a claimed process is patent-eligible under § 101 hinges 
on whether “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing.”). 
 105 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).  Since this ruling, the 
Federal Circuit has not had the opportunity to elaborate on process patent tests except 
in the context of graphic design.  See Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft 
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867-68 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
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examines two existing policies that have successfully addressed re-
lated issues, as well as a new proposal recently promulgated by the 
SACGHS. 
 
 
III. A RESEARCH EXEMPTION: ALLOWING SCIENTISTS 
TO USE THE GENETIC INFORMATION BEFORE 
THEM 
 
Every scientific advance is built on those that came before it.106 
 
The Myriad decisions reflect discontent with the limitations gene 
patents place on basic research and clinical care.  Ameliorating these 
problems, however, does not necessarily require the elimination of 
gene patents.  Indeed, since the Federal Circuit ruled that a patentee’s 
enforcement power extends beyond commercial use of a patented 
process or product,107 Congress has statutorily prohibited certain pat-
entees from using threats of infringement liability to dampen research 
or clinical care.  This section briefly describes those statutory exemp-
tions from liability.  It then turns to the SACGHS proposal, which 
would similarly limit a patentee’s authority to slow basic research but 
would not alter the patentability of gene sequences.  This proposed 
exemption is in line with existing laws—both in the United States and 
elsewhere—that are designed to promote rather than deter innova-
tion,108 and is ideal for universities seeking to conduct basic research 
and contract with private industry.  
A.  Existing Limitations on Patent Enforcement Power 
 
Congress has created exemptions from liability for two classes of 
researchers and clinicians, limiting the extent to which exclusivity 
over a product or process can slow innovation or patient care.   
  
 106 Stiglitz & Sulston, supra note 1, at A19 (Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel Prize 
winner in economics, and Sulston, the 2002 Nobel Prize winner in medicine, both 
supported the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation in 
their suit against Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah Research Foundation).  
 107 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed Cir. 2002) (ruling that 
the “experimental use” common law defense to an infringement action is limited to 
actions performed for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophi-
cal inquiry,” and does not include basic research) (quoting Embrex Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed Cir. 2000)). 
 108 REICHMAN, supra note 17, at 5-6, 11-12; Robert M. Portman, Legislative 
Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to 
Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 92 (1996). 
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First, Congress has prohibited patent owners from seeking relief 
for infringement that occurs in preparation for seeking regulatory ap-
proval of a drug or medical device from the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA).109  This allows researchers to develop generic drugs 
during a pioneer drug’s patent term, so that generics are ready for 
market immediately upon expiration of the pioneer patent.110  Because 
laboratory diagnostics are not subject to FDA regulations, diagnostic 
research is not similarly protected from infringement liability.111   
A second exemption shields medical providers from liability for 
infringement that occurs as the result of performing a medical or sur-
gical procedure.112  This exemption is narrow: it does not protect a 
provider from infringement liability for the use of a patented product 
or biotechnology process during the course of such a procedure.  
Therefore, a clinician is still not exempt from liability for performing 
a patented diagnostic test,113 although many have proposed such an 
extension.114  
Neither of these narrowly tailored exemptions has deterred inno-
vation, as opponents predicted each would.  Instead, these exemptions 
have served to ameliorate problems associated with patent exclusivity, 
and serve as a model as legislators attempt to mitigate similar logjams 
stemming from gene patenting.    
B.  A Proposed Research Exemption 
 
  
 109 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Act) exempts research done in preparation for submission to the 
FDA from infringement liability.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2011) (“It shall not be an act 
of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import 
into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”). 
 110 See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 
1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the abbreviated route by which Hatch-Waxman 
allows generics to come to market). 
 111 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 12, 61. 
 112 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2011). 
 113 Id. §§ 287(c)(2)-(c)(3). 
 114 A bill was introduced into the House in 2001, but failed to become law.  
See Genomic Research & Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th 
Congress (2002).  The National Research Council and College of American Patholo-
gists have advocated for such an exemption. SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 97; 
Gene Patents, COLL. AM. PATHOLOGISTS (Aug. 31, 2004), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20041024182035/http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/advocacy
/advocacy_issues/genes_patents.htm (accessed by searching for the original URL on 
Internet Archive) [hereinafter CAP Gene Patents]; Minwalla, supra note 88, at 500; 
Lekovic, supra note 46, at 296. 
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After analyzing the effect of gene patenting on genetic research, 
diagnostic quality, and clinical access, the SACGHS advised the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services to support, among other 
things,115 the legislative creation of an “exemption from patent in-
fringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the 
pursuit of research.”116  The SACGHS identified this exemption as a 
potential solution to several of the barriers that gene patents create for 
research.  This exemption not only opens the doors to unfettered basic 
research, but also is limited in scope; like the existing exemptions, it 
does not threaten the incentives patents provide for private investment 
in biomedical discoveries.  Finally, the proposed exemption offers a 
very mild approach—when compared with the Myriad alternative—to 
the problems created by gene patents.  From a university standpoint, 
the SACGHS’ proposed research exemption offers the best of two 
worlds: patented material is shared amongst researchers as if in the 
public domain, but new discoveries may still be privatized for com-
mercialization.  
The SACGHS recommended an exemption from liability for in-
fringement of gene patents conducted in the course of research as a 
tenable solution to several of the barriers it identified.  For example, 
patent owners would no longer be able to prevent unlicensed laborato-
ries from offering diagnostic tests.117  Thus, competing laboratories 
could offer verification testing, creating a check on testing quality, 
and a patentee without a diagnostic could not strip the market of the 
availability of any test at all.118  Moreover, patent owners would not 
be able to “sit on” an extant diagnostic, as the licensee of the gene 
patents related to congenital long QT syndrome did for two years.119  
Finally, researchers would not have to navigate patent thickets to li-
cense the right to perform further research on the diagnostic or thera-
peutic potential of a patented gene sequence.  The American Medical 
Association, the American College of Medical Genetics, and the Col-
  
 115 The SACGHS also recommended that the Secretary support an exemption 
from liability for all work pertaining to diagnostic tests used for patient care, promote 
adherence to non-exclusive licensing guidelines, increase transparency surrounding 
licensing agreements, establish an advisory board on gene patenting and health, pro-
vide advice to the Patent and Trade Office, and promote equal access to diagnostics.  
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 1-4. 
 116 Id. at 4, 97. 
 117 Klein, supra note 13, at 989. 
 118 SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 83. 
 119 Id. at 3-4. 
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lege of American Pathologists have long advocated for a research 
exemption to promote progress in diagnostics.120 
While the proposed research exemption would open the doors to 
unfettered basic research on gene segments, it would not further limit 
the enforcement power behind a gene patent.  Thus, for discoveries 
with potential commercial applications—such as therapeutics—
universities could continue to attract private investment in the com-
mercialization of a patented gene.  Basic research on these genes, 
however, would continue without restraint.  To the extent that this 
research produces an end product, incentive for private investment is 
not necessary.  
Finally, the proposed research exemption is a very minor adapta-
tion to the strength of a gene patent, particularly in light of the Myriad 
I alternative.  Indeed, some argue that a research exemption for the 
infringement of gene patents is tantamount to the disclosure require-
ment imposed on all patent claims.121  Because gene sequences are 
nothing more than units of information, allowing unfettered use is 
arguably the only way to ensure that a gene patent does not fail the 
disclosure requirement by impermissibly “restrict[ing] the public from 
perceiving and analyzing information about the invention.”122  From a 
university standpoint, the SACGHS’ proposed research exemption 
offers an ideal balance: academic researchers would have unrestrained 
use of genetic material, while technology transfer offices would retain 
the ability to seek patents on the products of their research.  Part IV 
examines the AUTM’s opposition to the proposed research exemp-
tion, and queries whether this resistance is misguided or reflective of 
profit-driven motives. 
 
IV. UNIVERSITY OPPOSITION: MAINTAINING 
RESEARCH EXCLUSIVITY OVER GENETIC 
INFORMATION 
 
AUTM has sided with industry to take a position that will harm 
the interests of university researchers, not to mention the patients who 
need these genetic tests.123 
  
 120 Minwalla, supra note 88, at 501; ACMG Position Statement, supra note 
40; CAP Gene Patents, supra note 116. 
 121 Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 796–97.  
 122 Id. at 797.  
 123 Press Release, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, UAEM Calls 
on AUTM to Retract Opposition to Panel Recommendations to Improve Access and 
Innovation in Field of Genetic Testing (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://essentialmedicine.org/story/2010/03/17/uaem-calls-autm-retract-opposition-
panel-recommendations-improve-access-and-innovat [hereinafter UAEM]. 
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The AUTM, along with several industry groups, has voiced strong 
opposition to each of the SACGHS’ proposals to improve research on, 
and access to, diagnostics.  The AUTM’s resistance to any of the rec-
ommendations is worthy of analysis, but its hostility towards the re-
search exemption is particularly striking, given the association’s pri-
mary focus on “managing and licensing innovations derived from 
academic and nonprofit research.”124  This section argues that the 
AUTM’s concerns with the proposed research exemption are exagger-
ated and unfounded, as the exemption would promote, rather than 
hinder, university research.  After laying out the role of the AUTM, 
this section describes the Association’s opposition to the SACGHS’ 
proposed research exemption.  It then argues that the AUTM’s claims 
have little basis in reality and raise a red flag: either the AUTM mis-
understands the purpose of Bayh-Dole, or it has adopted a misguided 
interest in securing rent-seeking licenses based on the fruits of aca-
demic researchers.  
The AUTM is a network of academic technology transfer manag-
ers who seek to “[f]acilitate the commercialization of research [re-
sults] for the public good . . . [and]. . . [g]enerate [university] income 
and promote economic growth.”125  The organization takes substantial 
strides to exert its influence: although it denies lobbying, it actively 
“educates and communicates with public officials” on any subject 
related to university intellectual property rights (IPRs).126  Facilitating 
unhindered research is a fundamental component of the AUTM’s mis-
sion,127 and it has twice confirmed its commitment to promoting ac-
  
 124 About AUTM, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, 
http://www.autm.net/About/2185.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 125 Id. 
 126 See generally Letter from the Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n et al., to John 
Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Nancy Pelosi, Democratic 
Leader of the House of Representatives (June 13, 2011), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/Mass%20Industry.pdf 
(expressing AUTM’s support for a proposed legislative provision that would allow 
the USPTO to retain all user fees); see generally Brief for Ass’n of Am. Univ. et. al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1159), 
2010 WL 5385333, at *4 (arguing that Bayh-Dole prohibits a researcher from licens-
ing a university’s rights to an invention to a third party); Gene Patents and Other 
Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 73 (2000) (prepared 
statement of James A. Severson, President, Cornell Research Foundation on Behalf of 
the AUTM).  
 127 One of the AUTM’s “[c]ore [v]alues” is that its work “benefits the public.” 
Mission and Goals, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.autm.net/Mission_and_Goals/4253.htm. 
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cess to basic research.  In 2007, the AUTM signed In the Public Inter-
est: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology, a 
policy statement that asserts that researchers should not be subjected 
to infringement liability.128  Two years later, the AUTM drafted a 
Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dissemina-
tion of Medical Technologies, asserting that intellectual property 
rights must not be used as a barrier to the dissemination of university-
developed research.129   
One day before the SACGHS released its Draft Report on Gene 
Patents and Licensing Practices, the AUTM—along with twenty-five 
members of the biopharmaceutical industry—sent a letter of “grave 
concerns” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.130  The 
letter strongly criticized the forthcoming SACGHS’ recommendations 
and predicted that their implementation would “seriously hamper pub-
lic/private collaborations and the commercialization of publicly-
funded research,” and “chill future investment and innovation.”131  
The AUTM explicitly disapproved of the proposed research exemp-
tion, alleging that it would undermine “the value of gene-based pat-
ents.”132  It also attacked the merits of the SACGHS’ findings, alleg-
ing that the report is “based on claims of a crisis . . . that does not ex-
ist.”133  It warned that “the recommendations, if implemented, would 
unravel . . . the patent system and the Bayh-Dole Act” and “do more 
harm to patients than good, by impairing the research, development 
and commercialization of the medicines and diagnostic tests of tomor-
row.”134   
The AUTM’s opposition to the SACGHS’ proposed research ex-
emption is unfounded and overstated: the proposed research exemp-
tion neither inhibits diagnostic progress nor removes the incentive for 
private investment in basic research.  First, the exemption would al-
  
 128 Letter from Ethan Guillen & David Watkins to Arundeep Pradhan, supra 
note 31, at 2. 
 129 Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dissemination of 
Medical Technologies, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, 
http://www.autm.net/Content/NavigationMenu/TechTransfer/GlobalHealth/statement
ofprincliples.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Letter from Ethan Guillen & David 
Watkins to Arundeep Pradhan, supra note 31, at 3. 
 130 Letter from James C. Greenwood to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 27, at 
1. 
 131 Id. at 1–2. 
 132 Id. at 2. 
 133 Letter from Ethan Guillen & David Watkins to Arundeep Pradhan, supra 
note 31, at 2 (quoting Letter from James C. Greenwood to Kathleen Sebelius, supra 
note 27, at 3). 
 134 Letter from James C. Greenwood to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 27, at 
3. 
2012] UNIVERSITY OPPOSITION TO UNFETTERED RESEARCH 165 
low university researchers to develop diagnostic tests without licens-
ing with private industry.  This is fully consistent with Bayh-Dole, 
enacted to attract private investment in basic research only where fur-
ther commercialization is necessary to bring a development to mar-
ket.135  Because diagnostic tests are “often ready for use straight out of 
the lab . . . they do not require the patent ‘carrot’ to attract invest-
ment.”136  Indeed, diagnostics are often entirely publicly funded and 
widely available long before a gene patentee develops a similar test.137  
Moreover, academic researchers who develop diagnostics report being 
motivated not by potential patents, but rather by the prestige, reputa-
tion, and career advancement that attach to break-through discover-
ies.138  Players in the biomedical industry agree: the patentability of a 
future diagnostic serves as a “very minor motivational role, at best.”139  
Second, where further commercialization is necessary to bring a de-
velopment to market, biomedical firms will continue to invest to de-
velop therapeutics out of basic research, as the proposed exemption 
does not alter the patentability of genetic discoveries. 
Indeed, the AUTM’s opposition to the proposed research exemp-
tion is alarming because the exemption offers universities the optimal 
arrangement.  Arming academic researchers with unrestrained use of 
gene segments would heighten productivity—leading to increased 
output of diagnostics and potential therapeutics—and would not hin-
der a university’s ability to seek a patent and use it as a negotiating 
tool in the commercialization of basic research.  Thus, the AUTM’s 
resistance to the SACGHS’ proposal appears to be motivated by one 
of two rationales.  First, the AUTM may be misconstruing Bayh-Dole 
to promote private investment even where basic research is sufficient 
to produce an end product.  This would be a blatant misconception: 
the law was unequivocally designed to encourage commercialization 
  
 135 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2011). 
 136 UAEM, supra note 125. 
 137 For example, tests for spinocerebellar ataxia, breast cancer, Canavan dis-
ease, familial long QT syndrome, and hearing loss were available before the eventual 
patentee of the related gene developed its own test.  SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 
31; see also More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 91; Stiglitz & Sulston, supra 
note 1, at A19.  
 138 Researchers responsible for discovering genes that cause Alzheimer dis-
ease, Tay-Sachs disease, and cystic fibrosis, all reported that their research in the area 
was motivated by these factors, rather than the potential of patenting their work. 
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21 (quoting Katie Skeehan et al., Impact of Gene 
Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Alzheimer Disease, 
12 GENETICS MEDICINE S71, S77 (Supp. 2010)).  
 139 Id. at 22 (interviewing pharmaceutical company executives, diagnostic 
testing laboratory directors, and representatives of the College of American Patholo-
gists and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation). 
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of basic research only where necessary to take a discovery from 
“bench to bedside.”140  Second, if the AUTM has not misinterpreted 
Bayh-Dole, its position may reflect an imprudent alignment with pri-
vate industry.  This is alarming and a cause for concern.  The AUTM 
cannot simultaneously cater to the conflicting objectives of for-profit 
and nonprofit institutions.  Indeed, its alliance with industry in resist-
ing a research exemption that would benefit academic researchers 
reflects that it may have already placed the former over the latter.  
CONCLUSION 
Gene patenting is steeped in controversy, largely because of the 
many complications it creates for scientists, clinicians, and patients.  
The stifling effect on basic research is one of the biggest problems 
stemming from current gene patenting practices: unchecked enforce-
ment power behind a patent has allowed patentees to shut down any 
and all research relating to a claimed segment of DNA.  This phe-
nomenon, along with barriers to clinical care, has stirred great debate 
over the merits of gene patenting and how the strength of such patents 
might be tempered. 
The recent partial invalidation, of two notorious gene patents—
BRCA1 and BRCA2—is an unprecedented judicial response to the 
problems posed by gene patenting.  Moreover, the differential reason-
ing and conclusions of each of the three judge appellate panel reflects 
flux and uncertainty regarding the validity of gene patents as a group.  
If nothing else, the disagreement within the Federal Circuit on the 
matter reflects the complexity of the problems in this area. 
Regardless of the ultimate validity of gene patents, legislative so-
lutions offer effective and modest modifications to the strength of 
gene patent that can ameliorate some of the problems associated with 
them.  One such solution is the SACGHS’ recent proposal for an ex-
emption from liability for infringement that occurs during the course 
of basic genetic research.  This exemption would allow academic re-
searchers unlimited use of all DNA sequences, but would not alter the 
patentability of related discoveries.  Thus, it would increase the effi-
ciency of basic research without detracting from a university’s ability 
to seek a patent and license the rights to a discovery that requires fur-
ther commercialization.  
Surprisingly, the AUTM opposes such an exemption.  The AUTM 
alleges that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incen-
tive for private firms to invest in upstream discoveries.  On the con-
  
 140 Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 796. 
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trary, the exemption would not affect collaboration with private indus-
try: where an academic discovery requires further commercialization, 
biomedical companies would continue to enter into licensing agree-
ments with universities.  Further, the exemption would open the doors 
to research relating to any gene segment, thus accelerating basic re-
search.  
The AUTM’s motivations in opposing the proposed research ex-
emption are suspect and appear to be based in either a misunderstand-
ing of the purpose behind Bayh-Dole or an improper alignment with 
industry goals.  Either is alarming, and would have negative implica-
tions for the management of the licensing of university innovations.    
 
